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UNCERTAINTY IN LAW AND ITS
NEGATION: REFLECTIONS
Gordon A. Christenson *
For this issue of the Review, the editors invited me to reflection.
In response, I wish to consider some aspects of a problem that has
bothered me over the past quarter-century. This problem arises from
radical subjectivism and its effect on the legal order. I believe that
something is radically subjective in law when one norm is considered
as valid as any other, or when one perception of facts is thought
as valid as any other, for the reason that any objective principles
for determining validity are either inadequate or considered mean-
ingless tautologies, masking the subjective preference of those with
power to invoke them in decision. The legal process then is simply
a name for containing contradictions and intractable conflict, a form
of denial of chaos to keep us secure in the illusion of an orderly
universe.
I.
The Problem of Hearing Only Our Own Voices
In George Bernard Shaw's play St. Joan, the maid was burned
to death as a heretic by the lords temporal after the lords spiritual
tried and convicted her of heresy at The Inquisition. She had heard
voices of-saints spoken directly to her as a soldier and not through
the Church. Accused of a terrible pride and self-sufficiency, Joan
asked, "Why do you say that? I have said nothing wrong. I cannot
understand." The Inquisitor replied that the Athanasian Creed laid
down damnation for those who cannot understand. Being good and
* Nippert Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; Dean, Univer-
sity of Cincinnati College of Law, 1979-1985. Dean Christenson currently is utilizing his
sabbatical at the Yale Law School to complete his study of privileges and immunities
jurisprudence.
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CINCINNA TI LA W REVIEW
simple is not enough, for the "simplicity of a darkened mind is no
better than the simplicity of a beast." She answered, "There is great
wisdom in the simplicity of a beast, let me tell you; and sometimes
great foolishness in the wisdom of scholars."
Threatened by fire, she recanted, believing that her voices deceived
her. "I have dared and dared; but only a fool will walk into a fire:
God, who gave me my commonsense, cannot will me to do that."
The English who captured her protested, but the Inquisitor said,
"The law must take its course, Master de Stogumber. And you
know the law."
Her recantation freed the maid only from excommunication. She
then learned that she still was damned to the dungeon and perpetual
imprisonment for her sins. In terrible anger, Joan snatched the recan-
tation and tore it to shreds. "Light your fire: do you think I dread
it as much as the life of a rat in a hole? My voices were right."
They excommunicated her as a relapsed heretic and cast her out,
abandoning her to the secular power. The English Chaplain, who
had cried all along for her execution as a political threat, shouted,
"Into the fire with the witch." As she was led to the stake, the In-
quisitor mused, "One gets used to it. Habit is everything. I am
accustomed to the fire: it is soon over. But it is a terrible thing to
see a young and innocent creature crushed between these mighty
forces, the Church and the Law."
In viewing the play, one is transfixed by a long moment of onstage
silence, accompanied by only the offstage flickering of a fire and
the voices of the sated crowd. The silence is broken by someone
frantically howling and sobbing. It is the English Chaplain, the one
who most outspokenly shouted for her burning. Wretching and
clutching at the air he cries, "I meant no harm. I did not know
what it would be like." The Earl of Warwick tells him to calm down,
for it was not his doing. But the English Chaplain's response makes
the first point of my personal reflection about the exercise of power
and the law:
I let them do it. If I had known, I would have torn her from their
hands. You don't know: you haven't seen: it is so easy to talk when
you don't know. You madden yourself with words: you damn yourself
because it feels grand to throw oil on the flaming hell of your own
temper. But when it is brought home to you; when you see the thing
you have done; when it is blinding your eyes, stifling your nostrils,
tearing your heart, then-then-. 0 God, take away this sight
from me!
The Master Executioner reported to Warwick that the Maid was
entirely consumed by fire, except her heart which would not burn.
[Vol. 54
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REFLECTIONS
Edmund Burke opposed the destructiveness of the French Revolu-
tion for reasons that seem reflected in Shaw's play. In his lengthy
epistle explaining why,I he wrote that lofty abstractions often mask
baser elements of greed, envy, vengeance, self-righteousness, or per-
sonal power under claims of right. Burke preferred action and
arguments from self-interest. He urged continuity in institutions.
He thought revolutions based on abstract notions such as the "Rights
of Man" allowed these destructive forces to lurk as deceptions hidden
in the language of action. In the study of law we try to penetrate
similar verbal abstractions that hide the vices. We resist "indoc-
trination" and demand students to work out responsibly their own
moral premises. We anticipate the need for independent competence
without illusion in representing clients no doubt also having human
vices. As Holmes said, we need to tempt the dragon out of its lair
on the plain to see its breath and count its scales before deciding
what to do with it.
We want to think that law exists "out there" as a coherent system
of clear rules that determines decision outcomes through self-
contained legal reasoning, apart from the context or circumstance
of the question. We are often beguiled by voices from the market
place preaching "the practical." Problems or disputes may be, and
most often are, rationally indeterminable. The law professor,
however, is expected to identify rules or skills coherently, then work
them through for the students' benefit, as if solutions to problems
in real life can be determined by naming rules or doctrine. Law
students pay attention, believing "the practical" means how to apply
a particular rule to a set of facts, almost magically, as if doctrine
is coherent and identical facts always are given or can be found.
Often, it does not seem to matter that much mischief may hide
beneath the plains of doctrine or that patterns do not form uniformly
in practice.
Can you see a rule or a skill in action? You might see people
acting in word and deed, but can you attribute life to a rule? William
Crosskey used to ask his Constitutional Law students, "Did you
ever see a 'living' document?" Can you taste a rule or feel a skill?
Can you experience what they are? Do they exist "out there"? Do
they have any meaning aside from the solution or avoidance of
human disputes, keeping people from fighting, or maintaining
"ordered liberty"? Must rules be logically coherent and certain in
themselves? Why? Why do we think they should? If we infer rules
and skills from patterns of decisions made by legitimate authority
1. See E. BURKE, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in THE HARVARD CLASSICS.
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for the overriding need to maintain and understand public order,
then how do we give recognition to the validity or rightness of the
content of those patterns or of the skills used to keep order? Why
should a totalitarian system of order be treated in law differently
from a democratic system? Do we regress into solipsism, where each
person (whether a citizen or dictator) hears only her own voices of
right? The personal power of decisionmakers listening to their own
voices with their own knowledge, or bending to the power of others,
may explain more than the lucidity of a coherent body of norms
in shaping and restraining that power.
The Quest for Certainty
To understand our predicament, we must begin with the Greek
distinction between physis and nomos and a resulting skepticism toward
the Platonic or religious ideal. The physical universe-physis-is
thought to yield certainty in its scientific laws, determined by neces-
sity. The moral or normative universe-nomos-is thought to operate
by human convention, under laws clear and coherent because they
are backed by sanctions from the state or from the gods. In the
Platonic ideal, truth, justice or right reason are forms, applying alike
to the physical and the moral universes. Truth and justice in opera-
tion are conceptions of reality measured by how well they conform
to such ideal forms or types, just as propositions of science describe
physical reality mirroring the forms of being. To the extent that
existence mirrors this ideal essence, it represents the reality of Truth,
Justice, Beauty, Virtue or the Good. We struggle to escape the con-
fusion this tradition has perpetuated by distinguishing, yet main-
taining sameness in, these two universes of reality. Always we return
to form or structure to seek certainty in linking our own voices to
Truth through some mythical or metaphoric ideal type.
So long as common morality, religion or understanding of
"natural rights" provided common standards within a society to
form a social contract that more or less furnished ideals to guide
private life, a system of liberty could work in practical government.
The idea of right or liberty is defined by what the state cannot do,
as in the negative limitations in the Bill of Rights. We have adapted
this Greek notion of limit or restraint to protect the people's imma-
nent substantive freedoms, freedoms which existed prior to the state
and reside in each of us, leaving us with the awesome power to
govern ourselves. Limitations on state power simply allow those
natural rights, indestructible by definition, to be. The Greeks had
a mythical construct for relating "virtue" to the universe. If a person
[Vol. 54
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REFLECTIONS
became too virtuous, too god-like, too ambitious, and went beyond
the pale, the gods would become jealous of this hubris of the claim
of a mortal to become a god. They would then send the Fates and
Furies to pursue and punish that person as a reminder of the limits
beyond which mortals should not go.
The scientific model, recalling the Greek distinction between the
physical and moral universes, introduced the difference between fact
and value, but the idea of limits remained for both. In the physical
world we distinguish between subjective value judgments and scien-
tifically constructed paradigms that determine the objective laws
of physical and biological truth based on the scientific method, en-
suring replication. We erroneously seek the same construct for the
social order and especially for the legal order. Through value-neutral
principles we have presumed that an objective, coherent, and just
order can be maintained autonomously and applied fairly to all.
So we pursue what science by nature cannot provide.
It is clear from the principle of uncertainty in the-field theory
and quantum mechanics developed by Werner Heisenberg, and
more recently, chaos theory, that the scientific method may be just
as subjective at the frontiers of science as are value judgments in
the social setting. Conceptions of esthetic form, poetic images,
mythical constructs and other forms of creative thought that esteem
symmetry might determine the direction of the scientific method
at the frontiers and lessen our absolute confidence that all scientific
truth is objectively discoverable. Our skepticism leading to subjec-
tivity at the scientific frontiers is matched by suspicion that the possi-
ble harmful consequences of science outweigh the benefits, as in
the use of nuclear energy. It is a moral choice after all, with no
certainty or coherence.
Paralleling our scientific processes, erroneous application of the
scientific method projects a mechanistic universe through behavioral
research into seemingly objective explanations of human and social
conduct. When the method is applied to a normative system such
as law, confusion easily leads to thinking that norms must be value-
neutral to have validity. They never are. A value-neutral,
mechanistically applied corpusjuris backed by the legal certainty of
sanction from the positive law of the state is thought to differ from
the subjective element of personal value and power to be eschewed.
We do not know how else to justify judicial review of legislation
or choices involving substitution of one's value preferences for
another's in the guise of legal norms. As long as a positivism
prevailed-where an objective legal norm backed by coercive sanc-
tion from the state could be constructed and generally observed-
1985]
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CINCINNA TI LA W REVIEW
then an objective normative system might be distinguished from
a subjective system of morality with continuity and security. The
proper spheres of autonomy and private morality could be kept apart
from those of legal norms. Certainty and order could prevail as
metaphors for a secure universe. Law restrained entry into the
private domain where natural rights could flourish in common.
We soon came to reject natural law as a basis for common
understanding of rightness, ironically, because we became too skep-
tical and fearful of the subjective whim of judges who listened to
their own voices. We became cynical of the reasons judges gave
for placing restraints on acts of a temporary majority thought to
be a democratic expression of legitimate policy made into law. We
suspected them of imposing their personal preferences as if they were
a super-legislature. Yet, to others, positive law enacted by temporary
majorities (just as judge-made common law) is often contradictory,
incoherent or offensive to a sense of fairness or right. Over the long
haul the courts are needed to protect against abuse. Hence, they
need critical evaluation of doctrine and operation to help shape deci-
sions to intervene and override positive law. Hamilton reflected (as
did Aristotle) the fear of mob-instinct, although the fear of oligarchy
or tyranny is just as great. Judges using law have not been thought
wise enough to make better judgments about what is good, or best,
than elected representatives. So, to avoid a greater harm, we leave
the bargaining to the give and take of representative government,
thinking judges should defer, unless required to intervene by prin-
ciples we generally find in constitutional limitations, to the political
branches. These limitations themselves are revised constantly by
resort to other knowledge and changes in society. Our criticism of
these limitations for lacking principle, coherence or clarity only in-
creases the confusion and encourages subjectivism-where one view
is as good as any other. The growth of the positive welfare state
and government action itself generates challenges against official
conduct. The character of the Rule of Law becomes confused with
assertions of affirmative entitlements rather than restraint on power,
loosening the moorings of limits to power made possible by counter-
assertions of power.
With legal realism we asked judges and other decisionmakers to
measure and appraise actual decisions in terms of their cumulative
effect in operation, without excessive regard to doctrine or to the
rhetoric of the language of decision. The resulting instrumentalism
in service of any policy also severed the conception of law from its
ends. Attempts at reconnecting the ends and means of the law
[Vol. 54
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REFLECTIONS
through value-oriented jurisprudence emerged as the holocaust
gathered and as Chief Justice Stone, with some help, wrote his
famous fourth footnote to Carolene Products, 2 which suggested a moral
and constitutional difference between legitimate social and economic
experimentation through majoritarianism in the states and il-
legitimate threats of a temporary majority against a powerless,
discrete and insular minority. The people's representatives were free
to experiment in the states to avoid social disasters and to intervene
actively, but legislation still was not necessarily valid without con-
nection to some overriding values held and shared through constitu-
tional interpretation and new political activism. Some rational
grounds to meet various evils are always found. Raw preferences
always find masks in some rational explanation. These subjective
preferences are made legitimate by judicial deference to the political
branches. Thus, critics found judicial blessings-even in inaction-to
these preferences.
Our suspicions about the power of the state and the intrusive and
active power structure it supports in favoring subjective preferences
led us to a renewed call that positive enactments or state action be
tested for validity against secondary norms that might express fun-
damental principles through new constitutional limitations or some
other guide from the social order. Judges then needed to find
guidance from some source other than plain texts. Ultimately, the
question was begged because we cannot easily tell what objective
principles, other than pure power or equilibrium in power relation-
ships, determine the validity of emerging constitutional or fundamen-
tal norms such as privacy or the right to life. We were led back
to the traces we found in "plain words in their context." Moreover,
we had traveled a long way down the road of doubting the legitimacy
of legislative and governmental processes that seemed more to reflect
official sanctioning of bargains among private interests than expres-
sions of our overriding public interest. But how could the judiciary
place limits when to do so without objective standards implies the
controlling impact of judges' subjective preferences? We are just as
wary of judicial formulas for second-guessing the legitimacy of
legislative processes as we are of the processes themselves. We are
driven to seek explanations to legitimize the bargaining among
factions.
Judicial activism by the Supreme Court did'for a time shape a
new set of norms through due process and equal protection con-
2. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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structs to test the validity of legislation or state action created by
bargains among factions or special interest groups. The international
human rights movement simultaneously brought new external ex-
perience to light, consciously making human rights anywhere in the
world the shared problem of all. Legal philosophers such as John
Rawls and Ronald Dworkin sought moral theories to guide legal
decision, or law, by reconnecting it with a sense of justice, fairness
and right. But in the meantime the use of economic analysis of law
blossomed. Almost in reaction to subjectivism, uncertainty, and the
ideologies of welfare economics, a more rigorous demand has grown
for coherence and certainty in producing and spreading benefits and
burdens efficiently. The need for new security using economic theory
is as baffling as the search for any certitude. The critical literature,
including student case notes in law reviews, reinforces the clamor.
It sings a chorus of criticism of legal decisions or doctrine for the
"failure to provide a coherent and clear" test for this or that prin-
ciple of law. It cares less what the principle is than that it be cer-
tain, consistent and efficient. If it is not, it is flawed. Economic
analysis at least is rigorous and coherent, if its premises first can
be accepted.
New restraints against state intervention now are being reimposed
by activist judges, but this time the trends favor market forces,
deregulation and, once again, economic liberty, as well as restraints
on deprivations of fundamental rights. As corporations are protected
in commercial speech as well as political speech, as state support
for religion has grown, as the national deficits have pressed for
restraint in social programs, and as United States technology and
industry have lost ground in the international marketplace, a renewed
interest in power is taking place among the branches of government,
between the national and state governments, and between the public
and the private sectors.
We perceive the changes that already have taken place only dimly.
The late longshoreman-philosopher, Eric Hoffer, once wrote that
change occurs first, then revolutions, but that change seldom oc-
curs by revolution. His instincts, drawn from common people, simply
reiterated what Crane Brinton had written earlier. We are now con-
fronting global change. In coping, our systems of law, public order
and legitimacy seem in disarray and in flux. The law seems to be
evolving to reflect private power arrangements through dated myth
structures drawn from frontier notions of libertarian ideals and skep-
ticism of government. The vastly complex and interdependent net-
work of political, social and economic decisions and their conse-
quences seems to baffle the law and other professions as well. The
legal profession seems drawn toward subservience to, rather than
[Vol. 54
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persuasive in shaping or informing, the forces of public and private
power now at work. The profession seems aggressively entrepre-
neurial in service of power. It seems to operate less as an indepen-
dent and autonomous counterbalance to power and more as a classic
European model, despite the separation of powers in our constitu-
tion, in merging parliamentary and corporate supremacy over the
legal system. Perhaps that subservience works best, as the Japanese
or even European economic and political forces have sought to
demonstrate by merging public and private cooperation. If so, we
are striving once more to seek certainty in an Austinian notion of
law as internal sovereign command, order and sanction by those
in effective control within the state.
II.
The validity of this resurgence of Austinian positivism emanating
from both private and state responses to radical subjectivism has
not gone unquestioned. The demands for coherence and certainty
in rules have led to at least four negative reactions. These have oc-
curred simultaneously in the last few decades with increasing
potency.
Negation of Authority
The first is the rise of the destructive urges directed against the
authority of the state for various injustices. Introduced first through
various social upheavals, they drew the national government into
active economic and social enterprise. The intensity of negative pro-
test gained force in the more recent calls for civil disobedience in
the wake of the holocaust, the civil rights movement and the war
in Southeast Asia. These urges are aided by earlier demands for
liberation within former colonial spheres such as India, Latin
America and Africa, by more recent liberation movements, and by
world-wide terrorism directed against the legitimacy of the coercive
power of the state. Amidst the chaos, cries are plainly heard from
within for order and security, for coherence. Wanting their own
freedom, the people want orderliness from others. This powerful
negation of authority simultaneously reinforces the need, paradox-
ically, for a strong state to keep order. For law, it means a call for
command and discipline. A revival of John Austin's jurisprudence,3
3. The novitiate will be rewarded by J. AUSTIN, THE AUSTINIA THEORY OF LAW
(W. Brown ed. 1983). See also J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1869); J.
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (2d ed. 1863); C. CLARK, PRAC-
TICAL JURISPRUDENCE, OR COMMENT ON AUSTIN (1883).
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CINCINNATI LA W REVIEW
valid or not, is curiously encouraged by such assaults. In the United
States, the pragmatic powers of analysis, coupled with Freud's no-
tion of thanatos, have fixed, by tranference, the destructive focus on
the abstraction of governmental authority. Especially, various nega-
tions place blame to expiate the anger and revulsions over the
assassinations of the 1960's, the despair over the initial decision to
succeed to colonialist regimes in Vietnam (and anger that we did
not prevail once a decision was made) and the feelings of betrayal
and rage at a President chased from office by allegations of the ex-
ercise of unanswerable power contrary to our entire legal tradition.
The loosening of our respect for the conventional construct of
the rule of law and national authority, which allowed the legal system
in the United States to work reasonably well, occurred at the same
time that the original Bill of Rights restraints on the national power
were being made applicable to the states. Since those applications
are essentially negations of state power in addition to preexisting
negations of federal power, the civil rights and other movements,
following an initial burst of creative statesmanship, produced a host
of secondary advocates based upon the construct of denial. The idea
of holding states accountable under the Bill of Rights, thought to
be forms of negative limitations on state power, produced many
well-educated advocates who used legal limitations in arguing for
restraints on state power and state action as substitutes for a com-
mon morality, like the negative of a photograph. This process also
has produced a proliferation of subjective notions of the substan-
tive content of morality or social justice that ought to prevail in law,
and has loosed assaults on various injustices such as consumer abuse,
environmental pollution, and deprivations of human rights. The
respect for objective norms based upon regularity in official con-
duct has been weakened while the resulting cacophony produces the
fear of chaos. In the absence of a new construct, atomistic behavior
with moorings in particular social or moral philosophies and religion
has become the order of the day, both in the private and the public
sector. Many tongues produce confusion in the legal order and a
common language of discourse is sought in many movements equally
discordant.
Displacement by Subjective Visions
Some dramatically characterize the trends just described as legal
nihilism or the negation of the exercise of legitimate power without
the assertion of substantive theory in its place. As Michael Polanyi
so cogently has noted, nihilism, whether real or imagined, leads
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REFLECTIONS
inexorably to authoritarian responses and to the rise of ideology.
The second phenomenon which gave rise to our particular predica-
ment thus emerged from the conversion of subjective moral judg-
ment into ideology. Whether derived from the twentieth century
revolutions based on socialism or Marxism, on the human rights
movement, or on a resurgence of neo-conservatism, the intellectual
roots of such movements are well described in European and Latin
American literatures. Symbolic of that literature, and resulting in
the negation of law and value, are Neitzche's moral andethical
superiority, Dostoyevski's novels and short stories and thworks
of the phenomenologists, existentialists and structuralists. All ask
similar questions. Post-Marxist thinkers- Habermas, Foucault and
Berger and other non-legal critical scholars-have gained influence
in legal scholarship which finds them to be useful analytic tools.
If there is no common basis for law or morality other than through
a subjective or ideological construct, then the question is not what
values underpin a particular legal system, but how one's subjective
preferences may be infused with power, strategy and tactics
throughout the general community or imposed by coercion. The
lawyer-advocate has long used various techniques based on pragmatic
ideas of progress, the frontier and change. These hav. been
associated with the romanticism of the defender of the poor and
downtrodden, the fighter for civil rights, the human-rights warrior
and the social reformer, who use courts and law as instruments of
social change. In this construct, law as a secular system has no nor-
mative content that is not ultimately subjective. If God is dead, all
things are morally possible. The main claim to legitimacy or valid-
ity rests in process; namely that the advocates who represent a par-
ticular morality or a particular social philosophy fight and prevail
as warriors and advocates in an existing decisionmaking process,
akin to chivalry, aimed at changing official behavior or custom by
fighting injustice, admittedly a subjective construct. Once, however,
the subjective advocacy model of changing the social structure is
an accepted way of life, the natural reaction is that sauce for the
goose is sauce for the gander. If the objective validity of the nor-
mative system tacitly is rejected by those who seek to change it,
then radicals holding an opposite belief might just as well produce
a similar claim by an activism with subjective preferences even more
firmly rooted within the vices of common life. The dialectic of thesis,
antithesis and synthesis that seemed to move outward from the sub-
jective to an objective world-view could work for the radical right
just as well as for the Marxist left!
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CINCINNA TI LA W RE VIEW
Troubled, of course, by the first.,amendment's protection of an
aggressive, adversarial press drawn to the negative drama of attacks
on symbols of authority or power (consider the media's obsession
with terrorism), or the protection of corporate speech, the
jurisprudence of a free society has sought to avoid radical atomism
and the potential legal chaos of subjectivism. Neo-natural law pro-
vides relief for some thinkers. Certainly in the writings of Alexander
Bickel and other thoughtful academics-turned-conservative, the value
of neutral principles, principled reasoning or value-neutral analysis
again becomes an end in itself. Better ways than judicial activism,
however, are necessary to protect those who present urgent social
and jurisprudential problems from subjective or ideological
perspectives.
The dialectic might move in either direction. Michael Perry is
now rethinking constitutional interpretation based upon a sacred
text morality. John Rawls has distinguished between the two rules
of morality, one being a form of categorical imperative drawn from
a Kantian notion, and the other being derived from the utilitarianism
of maximum efficiency within a group. The distinction by Ronald
Dworkin between policy and principle in his thinking about natural
law, the earlier work of Edgar Bodenheimer in asserting a scientific
method for determining what norms are widely accepted throughout
communities everywhere, and the ideas of constructing a proper
theory of constitutional interpretation, have all lead to endless sub-
jective visions and voices, each seeking recognition. For example,
Lawrence Tribe's work is based purely on his own visions of a just
constitutional order, as he is proud to confess. To be taken seriously,
theory must recognize the reality of subjective judicial activism. On
the other hand, it must create a way of accommodating these choices
with the vast changes and contradictions within a society living
under a 200-year old constitution.
Limitations on the majority in a democratic society when made
applicable to the states, through Bill of Rights provisions, have only
inflamed skepticism about federal judicial activism. Reading the Con-
stitution literally or textually, we find no apparent reason for a
distinction in principle between constitutional limitations for viola-
tions of so-called fundamental rights through the due process or equal
protection provisions and for similar limitations to social and
economic measures enacted by the majority which interfere with
so-called freedom of contract or economic liberties protected in earlier
times. Explanations arise from the social and political contexts. So
we are ultimately driven to construct a process of unwritten, organic
constitutional development through an incremental movement of
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REFLECTIONS
cases and precedents through judge-made constitutional law. Once
we have rejected the plain language of the Constitution or made
legitimate changing the meaning of its words, what basis for criticism
is there in evaluating decisions emanating from the Supreme Court
other than subjective criteria drawn from one's own moral or social
philosophy?
The process of radical advocacy at both extremes and the political
process of governmental shifts in position with respect to important
controversies have posed the question of which side will win or which
ideology will prevail at the margin, within the increment, as cases
are brought and decided. The direction the dialectic takes at any
given time seems subjectively imbedded in the politics which drive
the direction. Stability and continuity lie within that process. Any
activism or discourse which seeks to change the system or demystify
it only makes legitimate the proposition that anyone's subjective
normative position is as valid as any other's and that the only game
in town is in winning. Since intellectually we have come to reward
this type of thinking, how strange it does seem to see it used by
groups in law school communities and elsewhere in society when
the vehemence of their attacks implies that they very well might
lose. More likely, we are beginning to address the root problem
of confusion and contradiction in the intellectual underpinnings of
the normative system that has dangled the Platonic myth, in its
various disguises, before us for so long.
Reconstruction Through Economics
The third recent criticism and attempt to answer part of the prob-
lem comes from the school of law and economics which examines
the use of efficiency models in our collective or individual decision
processes. Skeptical of allowing legal rules or norms to make market
choices which ought to be made by individuals or firms, the law
and economics, or the economic analysis of law, advocates have in
effect proposed criteria of efficiency to evaluate a whole host of legal
rules. Modern juris-economic thought conceives of a legal rule as
an asset that depreciates over time, leading eventually to uncertainty
and decisional entropy. New rules created on that premise either
proliferate, creating further fissures in the legitimacy of any system
of objective, normative rules emanating from the state or the courts,
or seek to displace obsolete rules by oversimplification. Viewing
a legal precedent as an asset to be depreciated provides a way of
understanding how legal precedents come into being, are excepted
to, and go out of existence. The economic analysis of law provides
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CINCINNA TI LA W REVIEW
rigorous analytic tools for drawing distinctions between models of
efficient conduct, where choices in the marketplace are made, and
models of equity-moral choices-where inefficient but necessary
social values may be reflected through legislative or judicial protec-
tion of fundamental values. Even the legislative process is viewed
by some economic analysts as private bargaining for "rents" of of-
fice by representatives, at others' expense, resulting in "naked
preferences." The practical effect of economic analysis-whether
viewed as rigorous distinction or crass description-often is the nega-
tion of existing rules or of the legitimacy of statutes, without replace-
ment by objectively better rules or statutes the public may under-
stand and accept. The loosening of all relationships between an ob-
jective normative system and selfishly determined outcomes, whether
they be market efficiency or equity, in effect is a public choice to
reallocate the power to decide in favor of the private sector.
Many rules of law are but reflections of balance among various
values or purposes which may include efficiency but may include
other interests as well. Indeed, who doubts that rules of law are
metaphors, artificial constructs, thought necessary to guide officials
in the decision process? As Laswell and McDougal pointed out in
the early 1940's, applying rules by traditional doctrinal analysis and
legal reasoning simply begs the question of what the decision out-
come should be. There is nothing new in the critical legal studies
assault against the myth that objective, rational and neutral rules
determine outcomes. The economic analysis model with both its
constructs of depreciation of normative thought and its analysis based
on market choices, including the advocate's role in appraising market
efficiencies or monopolies, is likewise a negation of an objective nor-
mative system generally. The intellectual model bears resemblance
to the original conception of the rule of law as a limitation on the
exercise of sovereign power against individual liberty or groups of
individuals in a state. If law represents the sovereign command of
the state under the Austinian model, backed by sanctions and self-
restraint, then the economic analysis of the rules of law, derived
from such authoritative pronouncements, simply leads to the nega-
tion of the state's entry into the particularized micro-cosmic deci-
sions of each individual in the marketplace, whether of ideas or of
goods and services. Such a notion of law negates any objective nor-
mative system-except efficiency as a basis for legal decision-and
relies almost entirely upon the fact that rational individuals
themselves are the best deciders of values and subjective norms.
This view of rules based on their depreciation or absence assumes
that the free choice individuals subjectively make is better than a
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common set of objective norms in an autonomous legal system where
rules determine outcomes through classification schemes (and ought
to) only where, for reasons of policy or right, a moral choice be-
tween allocating burdens and benefits must be made. However, the
analytic model of negation or depreciation of existing norms itself
contains normative value choices of the marketplace, mainly in the
allocation of power, whether direct or tangential, over decisions.
Accepted, the model of the market place puts in motion the
cumulative effects of a multitude of private decisions whose conse-
quences imply a wholly different set of objective normative values
that may contradict, paradoxically, the initial attempt to free the
individual for choices. As Lester Thurow has stated, economic theory
does not explain how macro-economics can be internalized in micro-
economic decisionmaking. Legal theory might.
Criticism Turned Against Itself
The critical legal studies movement over the last decade is the
fourth direct challenge to the connection between the rule of law
and power relationships, including the problem of individual
autonomy in a community. In the tradition of phenomenology after
Hurserl and Heidegger, the new thinkers also need the social sciences
to understand human behavior. Various scalpels of criticism are
honed from European traditions. One branch, called "deconstruc-
tionism," after the literary critical writings of Derrida and other
post-structuralists, is struggling to offer constructive alternative vi-
sions, but its critique is criticized as utopian. To "deconstruct" a
structure that gives meaning to what is not present (e.g., that assigns
meaning to abstractions such as "consideration" or "the Founders
intentions") is difficult to apply to the discourse of law. Radical
critical discourse, however effective, seems to offer no better solu-
tions in action than those of the economic and social libertarians,
but the discourse loses meaning amidst the proliferation and new
formalisms of its own voices. It seems peripheral to action, for what
does criticism offer to guide what we shall do when its critical theory
is turned to itself? This question is inescapable when a philosophical
rather than literary examination of Jacques Derrida's deconstruc-
tionism, as recently conducted by Henry Staten in his study of
Derrida and Wittgenstein, 4 clarifies our understanding of its limits.
Deconstruction is a textual labor, not a system of concepts or ac-
tion. Traversing a text, we must retain the track of the journey or
4. See H. STATEN, WITTGENSTEIN AND DERRIDA (1984).
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CINCINNA TI LA W RE VIEW
risk falling back into a naive objectivism. In late Athens, Socrates
similarly encountered the angry young disciples who "smashed and
grabbed," using his own method without preserving or transform-
ing it. They acted on it in pushing him to the hemlock. Greater
poignancy today emerges from the critical thinkers who retain hope
through demystifying the present metaphors we used to undergird
the rule of law with almost tragic belief that a better way will spring
up, somehow, magically from the discourse. It reminds us of
Holmes's view of Marx as a naive romantic who thought the world
would be a better place after but one more revolution.
I believe we are in one of those periods of epochal change where
our ways of looking at and understanding the law and its normative
place have not kept pace with the actual changes that have occur-
red around us. We can glimpse these changes through global pat-
terns of the flow and control of information, wealth, technology,
people, power, violence and deprivation. The critical studies
movements help us to understand the dimensions and content of
these changes, as deconstructionism does in using language more
critically to transform this understanding. As a learned profession,
we are amazingly closed to open inquiry, and would be better off
to listen. Relatively few in the legal profession, aside from a few
law professors, judges or lawyers, even attempt systematically to
construct better ways of linking our understanding of law though
other knowledge. It is easier to develop destructive criticism and
easier still to negate that by a move to authority. Even most law
teachers find it difficult to integrate scientific and normative think-
ing or to read about knowledge from new sources. We already have
too much to do. Yet we will need this substantive understanding
ultimately and should struggle to seek it here in our universities.
We have more to offer the hopeful public service instinct of the
next generation of law students than the abstract summaries of rules,
procedures, and skills that meet the demand for perceived voca-
tional qualifications. We also have better alternatives to create than
only negation where liberty contradicts itself, as happened in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe after World War II. The moral crisis in
the profession demands better educational vision. If we hand our
heritage to others with power, they will not hesitate to use it. Ironic-
ally, then, the voices each of us hears to construct our own separate
visions of justice or the common good will not sing in harmony.
They will be so cacophonous that the ensuing power struggles will
yield spent moral energy to the other forces at work in this massive
transformation. Order will be made to prevail over such chaos. Law
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as we know it may then become even more unabashedly the instru-
ment of pure power. Even if it does, our sense of balance and our
long-run common interest require more from the academy than
either acquiescence or self-flagellation. We may need to stare chaos
in the face, as Staten recently wrote:
[S]uppose the scene before me, always threatening to get out of con-
trol now that the hardness of the law has been questioned, exploded
into its characters and left me completely disoriented, before apparent
chaos and anarchy? "Then I should say something like 'I have gone
mad;' but that would merely be an expression of giving up the attempt to know
my way about."'
While I do not wish this condition nor do I ultimately believe the
result will be so, we must pay attention to the new voices to hear
their questions. The danger to those of us who profess law is that
the hopeful voices will find no support, even from themselves, once
they have crossed the Rubicon to negate its mythical construct. In
a power struggle, they are more likely to lose than to win, and
paradoxically they seem to despair because they are without illu-
sion. I see no reason to accept self-destruction like a scorpion that,
ringed with fire, stings itself to death. I would not place the critical
thinkers with St. Joan either, as innocents being burned at the stake
for remaining true to their own voices. Far from being exiles, they
should be with us and presumed responsible. I think of them also
in the secular tradition of both David Hume and the Enlighten-
ment, at once skeptical and yet too inclined to act on abstractions.
And I am reminded of ancient Zeno, clutching the proof that an
arrow subscribing to a certain logic would never reach the targeted
tree, but knowing, always, that it does.
III.
As I end my second law deanship after more than twelve years
combined, I have begun to see the vision of our tradition more clearly
through Burke's eyes than through those following Rousseau and
the French Revolution. It is interesting to me that Burke asked the
same questions that some of my colleagues now ask. He wrote in
1790:
History consists, for the greater part, of the miseries brought upon
the world by pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition,
5. Id. at 160.
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hypocrisy, ungoverned zeal, and all train of disorderly appetites, which
shake the public with the same
-"troublous storms that toss the private state, and render life
unsweet. "
These vices are the causes of those storms. Religion, morals, laws,
prerogatives, privileges, liberties, rights of men, are the pretexts....
You are terrifying yourselves with ghosts and apparitions, whilst your
house is the haunt of robbers. It is thus with all those, who, attend-
ing only to the shell and husk of history, think they are waging war
with intolerance, pride, and cruelty, whilst, under colour of abhor-
ring the ill principles of antiquated parties, they are authorizing and
feeding the same odious vices in different factions, and perhaps in
worse. . . . I do not deny that, among an infinite number of acts
of violence and folly, some good may have been done. They who
destroy everything certainly will remove some grievance. They who
make everything new, have a chance that they may establish
something beneficial.
6
Perhaps we are left in the wake of criticism against this mythical
autonomous system of objective legal norms with what we have
always experienced in practice, namely, that individuals seek power
and self-interest through many guises, including the courts,
knowledge and rules of law that always contain elements of ideology
and result-oriented politics. However, a general criticism against
values and principles that undergird the entire process may pro-
duce in legal scholarship a form of entropy or paralysis instead of
a major affirmative attempt in jurisprudential thought. Even Witt-
genstein's view of language games sought to preserve the affirmative
common usage at the same time it moved beyond, by the play. The
task for us is to come to grips with the pervasive problem of nega-
tion. If we do not face it, and begin to affirm a common under-
standing of substantive content, then the legal system will continue
to grow alien to the human condition. The question is whether it
is already simply an instrument in the hands of those who can claim
the most influence and be most powerful in manipulating the ex-
isting system for the private ends of themselves or their clients or
the public ends of the state.
I have supported diversity, skepticism and the argument from
self-interest for the practical reasons of wanting always a way for
the new to enter and because I am too wary to wish to destroy the
vessels that hold our past experience. With Karl Llewellyn, I reject
the argument of exclusion that "if a, then not b," preferring the
6. E. BURKE, supra note 1, at 275-76, 376.
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argument of inclusion, "if a, then also b." Through diversity made
legitimate by links to all knowledge, the new should always be
allowed to enter from the outside. The other should always be pre-
sent. We should trust that colleagues with differing views will not
harm us, even if there is risk. We should believe in students as the
new generation, even if some will disappoint us. Every person's own
vision of justice is of value, especially when reciprocally accepting
the other. If we must risk erring, we should err on the side of
tolerance and generosity. If we have only questions, at least we can
listen. We need to listen to the questions of others, such as those
Leonardo da Vinci asked hundreds of years ago in his notebooks
when he forsaw chaos unloosed by science. The courageous still ask
such questions, as destructive forces are seen instantly and daily
when television brings the world into the perceptions of our inner-
most sanctuaries. We ask what madness is unleashed by the hubris
of killing off those who speak with different voices? We always return
to St. Joan or Antigone for their lasting appeal to those different
voices and the courage it takes to listen to them.
As with most who are ending one service and beginning another,
I am especially pleased by the dedication of this issue to me and
for my friends and colleagues who have gladly contributed. It is
an ending with a vision of a new beginning in the company of a
world community of scholars who are privileged in a free society
to be able to think about these things and to argue passionately about
our destination.
1985]
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